

## ***Extremely Confused: the Government's new counter-extremism review revealed***

### **Short Summary**

- The Government's "Rapid Analytical Sprint" to determine its policy on extremism has been leaked to Policy Exchange.
- It says the UK's approach to extremism should no longer be based on "ideologies of concern" but on a very wide range of "behaviours," including violence against women and girls, "spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories," an interest in gore or extreme violence, misogyny, or involvement in "an online subculture called the manosphere." It admits itself that many who display such behaviours are not extremist.
- This approach could swamp already stretched counter-extremism staff and counter-terror police with thousands of new cases, increasing the risk that genuinely dangerous individuals are missed. It risks addressing symptoms, not causes.
- The Sprint de-centres and downplays Islamism, by far the greatest threat to national security. It acknowledges "left-wing, anarchist and single issue (LASI) extremism," "environmental extremism" and Hindu extremism as distinct phenomena that counter-extremist policy should tackle. The left may object to the first two; others will welcome it.
- The Sprint will raise concerns over freedom of speech. It says claims of two-tier policing are a "right-wing extremist narrative." It recommends the reversal of moves to cut police use of "non-crime hate incidents." A new crime of making "harmful communications" online – rejected by the previous government on freedom of speech grounds – is floated.
- The Sprint may have been influenced by the events of Southport. But as in the Prime Minister's remarks after the killer's guilty pleas last week, it risks confusing extreme violence with extremism, or extremism with any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried.
- What happened in Southport was more an operational than a policy failing. The murderer had shown he was dangerous many times over several years before he killed anyone. In a more operationally effective policing and justice system, action would have been taken against him sooner, even without having to first label him an extremist.
- There is a case, as the former counter-terror policing chief Neil Basu has said, for creating a "non-extremist" version of Prevent aiming to interdict people, such as the Southport killer, with an interest in violence but no obvious ideological or political motivation. The recommendation by a previous reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross, that the current programme is the wrong place for dealing with the psychologically unstable has been ignored, even repudiated, in the Sprint. It should be acted on.
- There are several sensible proposals, including the creation of a new Ministerial Counter-Extremism Board to co-ordinate policy.

## Part 1: Overview and Key Themes

In August 2024, the new Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, announced a review, in her words a “Rapid Analytical Sprint,” of Government policy on extremism. She said it would “map and monitor extremist trends” and “understand the evidence about what works” to “underpin a new strategic approach to countering extremism from Government.”<sup>1</sup>

Policy Exchange has been leaked the analysis paper, the capping paper, and the full recommendations of that Sprint, along with documents about a proposed Counter-Extremism Ministerial Board. They are in several respects sensible - but in other ways confused, and potentially damaging.

The Sprint de-centres and downplays ideology in general, and Islamism in particular. The Government should, it says, take an “ideologically agnostic approach: not basing HMG’s approach on a definition [of extremism] or specific ideologies of concern, but on behaviours and activity of concern.”

The analysis paper, entitled “Understand,” says that “narrow definitions” of extremism which are “predicated on violence, or that have a requirement for an ideological dimension,” will “exclude many damaging extremist beliefs and movements and associated harms that may warrant intervention.”

The “behaviours and activity of concern” and “damaging extremist beliefs” listed in the various documents include a vast constellation of attitudes and acts – among them “conspiracy theories,” misogyny, violence against women and girls, having “a fixtured on gore and violence without adherence to an extremist ideology,” “preventing integration,” “influencing racism and intolerance,” or involvement in “an online subculture called the manosphere.”

Government should certainly be alarmed by, and should tackle, violence against women and other social harms – but they do not, or largely do not, constitute extremism. One of counter-extremism’s key problems has always been deciding which of the many individuals who come to their attention they should focus their limited resources on. Including a range of other crimes and social ills in the remit risks swamping already stretched interveners and counter-terror police with tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of new cases. It makes it more likely that dangerous people will be missed or not properly dealt with, as in the case of the murderer of David Amess MP.

Expansionary definitions also risk triggering even greater and more distracting political controversy than now, from both right and left. The “understand” paper, for instance, in its

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<sup>1</sup> <https://news.sky.com/story/home-secretary-yvette-cooper-to-crack-down-on-people-pushing-hateful-beliefs-13198972>

section defining what is extreme right wing, says that “claims of ‘two-tier’ policing” are an example of a “right-wing extremist narrative.”

For the left, recommendation 22 – creating a “dedicated national investigations capability” to “co-ordinate and take on protest and low-level extremism operations and investigations” and a digital “national centre of excellence for the monitoring and disruption of protest” – may be equally neuralgic.

Others will welcome, and see as overdue, the Sprint’s designation of “left-wing, anarchist and single issue (LASI) extremism” and “environmental extremism” as distinct phenomena that counter-extremist policy should tackle. The co-founder of one LASI group, Palestine Action, is currently awaiting trial on a terrorism charge (albeit for allegedly expressing support for an Islamist terror group rather than for an act of terrorism carried out by Palestine Action).<sup>2</sup> Other actions by PA have used significant violence. Another previously underplayed subject mentioned in detail, probably for the first time in a major policy document, is Hindutva extremism, which played a part in serious disturbances in Leicester in 2022.

Restrictions on the use of “non-crime hate incidents” brought in by the last government should be “reversed,” the Sprint says, risking further anger about free speech and diversion of police resources. This would, if taken forward, breach promises made by No10 after the row two months ago over police investigating a tweet by a newspaper columnist, Allison Pearson.<sup>3</sup> A new criminal offence of making “harmful communications” on social media is floated. This was rejected by the previous Government because, in the Sprint’s words, it risked “criminalising speech on the basis that it had caused someone offence.”

The capping paper says that “the scope of HMG’s counter-extremism work is to focus on the highest harms caused by extremism. We see this to be the encouragement, enabling and advocating of the top two tiers of harms - national security and public safety.”

If that is indeed to be the case, it is quite clear what the main target and focus should be. In Great Britain, Islamists are responsible for 94 per cent of all deaths caused by terrorism since 1999 and around 88 per cent of injuries caused by terrorism over the same period.<sup>4</sup> Last year, Islamists accounted for 80 per cent of the police’s counter-terror caseload,<sup>5</sup> 75 per cent of MI5’s<sup>6</sup> and 63 per cent of terrorists in custody.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.crowdjustice.com/case/richard-barnard/>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.thetimes.com/article/b7b5898d-ea05-4b03-853a-56f18578dda7>

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>5</sup>

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66473eddf34f9b5a56adc9e3/E03131940\\_HC\\_775\\_Lord\\_Walney\\_Review\\_Accessible.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66473eddf34f9b5a56adc9e3/E03131940_HC_775_Lord_Walney_Review_Accessible.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/Government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-tact-2000-to-june-2024/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stop-and-search-great-britain-quarterly-u#terrorist-prisoners>

But the Sprint's "understand" paper devotes the same amount of space – one page – to Islamist extremism as to "conspiracy theories," "pro-Khalistan extremism" (the movement for an independent Sikh state), extreme misogyny," and "environmental extremism," which also get a page each but have between them since 1999 in Great Britain caused no terrorist deaths.

Many of these supposed other extremisms simply do not meet the test of causing harm to national security or safety - or even, often, the test of extremism. The Sprint's section on conspiracy theories, for instance, admits that "many of those who believe in [them] do so without holding any deeper commitment to recognisable extremist ideology, e.g [they have a] belief in UFO coverups or in alternate explanations of 9/11."

The only UK real-world effect listed in this section is a brief attempt in 2021 by about 20 members of a "freeman on the land" group to "occupy Edinburgh Castle, saying they were reclaiming it under article 61 of the Magna Carta." (It is true, of course, that some extremists do subscribe to conspiracy theories, for instance the belief of some Islamists or Far Right wingers that a Jewish cabal runs the world, but this is a symptom, not the extremism itself.)

The paper's section on "extreme misogyny" and the "manosphere" concedes that "not all individuals or groups associated with the manosphere... promote extreme views" and "it is challenging to identify the extent to which misogyny is explicitly and consciously (or unconsciously) operationalised among violent extremists."

The Sprint divides misogynists into subgroups such as Men's Rights Activists, Pick-Up Artists (PUAs) and involuntary celibates, or incels. PUAs are networks of men who spread tips and techniques, some of them manipulative, for seducing women. The Sprint admits that "while some PUA techniques cross into criminality such as rape and sexual assault... the movement and influencers do not necessarily meet any definitions of extremism." Some MRA groups "have advocated violence against women" but "most individuals in the incel movement do not advocate violence against women and the greatest risk of violence among incels is self-harm."

On misogyny, even if you accept the government's view that it should come under the extremist umbrella, the Sprint already looks incomplete; there is little reference to the grooming gangs which so blighted the lives of girls and young women in scores of towns and cities. It is hard to see how progress can be made on reducing violence against women, and public confidence assured, unless countering grooming gangs, and the difficult questions that necessarily involves, are part of the programme. The main mention of the subject in the leaked documents is that "right wing extremists frequently exploit cases of alleged group-based sexual abuse to promote anti-Muslim sentiment as well as anti-government and anti-'political correctness' narratives" (note also the "alleged.")

The other forms of extremism identified are the "extreme right wing," which has since 1999 been responsible for six terrorist deaths, "Hindu nationalist extremism," which was a factor in the 2022 riots in Leicester and in other acts of intimidation, "left-wing, anarchist and single issue extremism," also known as LASI, and "violence fascination."

Case studies in the “understand” paper include one, of about 430 words, on leafleting and stickering campaigns by two Far Right groups and another, of about 320 words, on the hundreds of “Punish a Muslim Day” poison-pen letters sent by a single individual. Neither of the people convicted for these incidents faced terror charges, and neither caused physical harm (the monitoring group for anti-Muslim hatred, Tell Mama, reported that Punish a Muslim had resulted in one incident of school bullying.)

There is also a long case study on the Earth Liberation Front, an eco-extremist group active against inanimate objects such as buildings and phone masts in the 1990s but whose last reported attack in Britain was more than ten years ago.

The only Islamist case study is much briefer. It concerns Anjem Choudary’s al-Muhajiroun, which by 2016 had direct and provable links to almost a quarter of all Islamist terrorists convicted in the UK, including the UK’s first ever Islamist terror attacker and the murderers of Drummer Lee Rigby in 2013.<sup>8</sup> Al-Muhajiroun supporters went on to commit two further major terror attacks, at London Bridge/Borough Market in 2017, killing eight people, and Fishmonger’s Hall in 2019, killing two. None of this is mentioned in the case study, but perhaps at only 160 words there wasn’t enough room.

The Sprint’s playing down of ideology in general, and Islamism in particular, risks becoming a major victory for what William Shawcross, a previous reviewer of the main counter-extremism programme, Prevent, called the “concerted campaign by some, including a number of Islamist groups, to undermine and delegitimise Prevent,” dismiss the term Islamism and claim that other threats are just as serious.<sup>9</sup>

It is also a repudiation of one of Shawcross’s main critiques, that Prevent had “increasingly come to be seen as synonymous with safeguarding – i.e. an emphasis on protecting those referred into Prevent from harm and addressing their personal vulnerabilities...Prevent is carrying the weight for mental health services. Vulnerable people who do not necessarily pose a terrorism risk are being referred to Prevent to access other types of much-needed support. This is a serious misallocation of resources and risks diverting attention from the threat itself.”<sup>10</sup>

The largest single group of Prevent referrals, 36%, is currently neither for Islamism nor the Far Right, but for “vulnerability present with no ideology or counter-terrorism risk.”<sup>11</sup> The Sprint implicitly rejects Shawcross’s recommendation that Prevent should send these cases elsewhere and re-focus on its original purpose: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.thetimes.com/article/95f8662a-670a-11e6-8639-a8ec19d372cc>

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[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e26968d3bf7f17385a3421/Independent\\_Review\\_of\\_Prevent.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/63e26968d3bf7f17385a3421/Independent_Review_of_Prevent.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/Government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-prevent-to-march-2024/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2023-to-march-2024>

And it is also a rejection of the extremism definition introduced by the Communities Secretary in the previous Government, Michael Gove, who listed five organisations – three Islamist, and two Far Right – as being assessed to see whether they met it. Two of the Islamist organisations which Gove named, MEND and CAGE, have been at the forefront of the campaign to undermine Prevent and deny Islamism’s seriousness as a threat. (The Sprint says the Gove definition should not be formally dropped, since two departments are already using it, but should not be a major part of the Government’s approach.)

Not using a formal extremism definition as a major tool is not necessarily a bad thing. As the Sprint notes, and as many including three former Tory Home Secretaries said at the time,<sup>12</sup> there were “concerns that [the last Government’s definition] could be used against legitimate organisations and individuals, especially in the absence of a test of proportionality and reasonableness, safeguards and an appeal body.”

Trying to apply it to individual organisations would have consumed a great deal of effort, given lawyers a field day and risked any dubious group which fell just below the threshold, was felt too legally risky to include, or was able to overturn its designation in court on some technicality, being able to proclaim that it had been officially pronounced non-extremist.

However, the Sprint’s increased emphasis on behaviours runs the clear risk that we end up tackling the symptoms of extremism, instead of the causes. The “understand” paper, in particular, treats extremism largely as a problem of individuals, or at least individuals radicalised online. While this is a significant route into extremism, the Sprint largely ignores the roles of institutions in spreading and incubating extremism, and particularly ignores the significant power of institutions in Islamist extremism.

Another reason why Islamism is Britain’s most serious extremist threat is that it has a significantly greater institutional presence than any other form of UK extremism, influencing or controlling some mosques, private schools, media outlets, charities and pressure groups. This goes unmentioned in the Sprint documents seen by Policy Exchange.

Another subject not given much attention is the growing agitation around blasphemy, despite the Batley Grammar School incident – which forced a teacher into hiding, where almost four years later he remains – and campaigns against films such as *The Lady of Heaven*. There is reference to the importance of avenging insults to Islam to both Islamist extremists and terrorists, and to the reviews by the Government’s own social cohesion advisor, Sara Khan, and its Commissioner for Political Violence, Lord Walney, recommending additional guidance for teachers and better support for teachers and schools who are threatened or harassed. But the Sprint does not appear to give significant weight to this subject.

Extremism is not the same as terrorism, of course. And, as the Sprint says, some people do present serious risks without possessing a clear ideology. The Director-General of MI5, Ken McCallum, said last year that “straightforward labels like ‘Islamist terrorism’ or ‘extreme right wing’ don’t fully reflect the dizzying range of beliefs and ideologies we see. We’re

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<sup>12</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/mar/10/three-ex-tory-home-secretaries-warn-against-politicising-anti-extremism>

encountering more volatile would-be terrorists with only a tenuous grasp of the ideologies they profess to follow. People viewing both extreme right wing and Islamist extremist instructional material, along with other bits of online hatred, conspiracy theories and disinformation.”<sup>13</sup>

## Southport

The Southport murders, committed by Axel Rudakubana, who in the Home Secretary’s account was “obsessed with massacre or extreme violence” but who lacked a clear ideology,<sup>14</sup> might seem to be a clear example of the phenomenon described by McCallum, though there is much about the case we still do not know. A “learning review” into Rudakubana’s interactions with Prevent said he was dropped from it because “too much weight was placed on [his] absence of ideology.”<sup>15</sup>

Might this, therefore, show that the Sprint’s new, de-ideologised and behaviour-focused approach is right? The document may well have been influenced by the facts of the Southport case, which would probably have been known to those writing it. The Sprint’s recommended new approach also strongly aligns with the Prime Minister’s claim last week, after Rudakubana pleaded guilty, that “terrorism has changed” and “this case is a sign. Britain now faces a new threat.... acts of extreme violence perpetrated by loners, misfits, young men in their bedrooms, accessing all manner of material online, desperate for notoriety.”<sup>16</sup>

Starmer added: “When I look at the details of this case: the extreme nature of the violence, the meticulous plan to attack young children...violence clearly intended to terrorise, then I understand why people wonder what the word ‘terrorism’ means. And so, if the law needs to change to recognise this new and dangerous threat, then we will change it – and quickly. And we will also review our entire counter-extremist system to make sure we have what we need to defeat it.”<sup>17</sup>

But Starmer’s words, and the leaked Sprint documents, suffer from a serious confusion. The Prime Minister explicitly confuses extreme violence with extremism and terrible acts with terrorism. But terrorism is an act designed to terrorise a community or a section of a community for political ends. In her own statement, the Home Secretary spoke of “the wider challenge of rising youth violence and extremism.”<sup>18</sup> But again, this is a confusion, or at least a conflation. Are, for instance, postcode wars between teenage gangs – youth violence which is often extreme, often terrible, and usually organised - now to be counted as extremist or terrorist? The Sprint, likewise, risks extending the definition of extremism to

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<sup>13</sup> <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update>

<sup>14</sup> <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-01-21/debates/70A99479-E1AB-4D28-AC21-024A77A05D3E/SouthportAttack>

<sup>15</sup> <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-01-21/debates/70A99479-E1AB-4D28-AC21-024A77A05D3E/SouthportAttack>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/pm-statement-on-the-southport-public-inquiry-21-january-2025>

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*

<sup>18</sup> <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2025-01-21/debates/70A99479-E1AB-4D28-AC21-024A77A05D3E/SouthportAttack>

cover any shocking crime, bad belief or nasty social phenomenon about which we are worried.

In doing so, it runs the risk that those fighting extremism and terrorism will be damagingly diverted from their actual job - defending the security of the country, its democratic system, its values and its institutions against those, and only those, whose beliefs and acts intentionally threaten them.

The independent reviewer of counter-terror legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, said Starmer's proposed test of "violence clearly intended to terrorise" risked "too many false positives, such as domestic violence, unless the intended target is clearly the wider public not the immediate victim. Even this would still catch extortion by criminal gangs and serious hooliganism...The national security apparatus has major threats to manage, including Isis-K and Russian sabotage...[It] could be overwhelmed with dangerous and apparently dangerous individuals, vying for attention as potential terrorists."<sup>19</sup>

In his statement on the Southport case, Starmer also confused policy failings with what were in fact operational failings. Rudakubana had come to the attention of the authorities, showing them he was plainly dangerous, as many as 15 times over several years before he killed anyone. In a more operationally effective justice or policing system, action would have been taken against him sooner, even without having to first label him an extremist. Rudakubana was convicted of one (relatively minor) count under the Terrorism Act, but his main convictions were for non-terrorist offences. In this case, as the trial judge said, debating whether his crimes were or were not terrorism "misses the point."<sup>20</sup>

Both Neil Basu, the former counter-terror police commander, and Hall now argue (as did Shawcross) for something akin to a "non-extremism" version of Prevent aimed at individuals with a fixation on violence but no clear ideology. As Hall put it: "This is not about definitions, it's an organisational issue and I think a major one. It suggests the need for a wholly new capability to deal with those motivated by non-instrumental extreme violence."<sup>21</sup> Policy Exchange agrees with this.

Those who argue that Rudakubana's acts did damage the security of the country – setting communities against each other and triggering wide breakdowns of public order – overlook, firstly, that this does not appear to have been his intention and secondly, that the disorder was due at least in part to further operational failings by the authorities: above all not being open enough, quickly enough, about the crime and the defendant.

That created an information vacuum - which in the new social media landscape bad actors, some meeting any conceivable definition of extremist, were more than able to fill. Some of the authorities' caution was due to legal restrictions (which may need to be changed) but not all. Shocking crimes in the past have seen more information released, and sooner, most

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<sup>19</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/91fc342d-7ccb-4613-b786-90bb4e20484e>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2025/jan/23/southport-attacks-axel-rudakubana-sentenced-over-murder-of-three-girls?page=with:block-679269b58f0861aa8602a004#block-679269b58f0861aa8602a004>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.ft.com/content/91fc342d-7ccb-4613-b786-90bb4e20484e>



notably when Jo Cox MP was murdered by a Far Right terrorist.<sup>22</sup> A concern not to say anything which might backfire about a sensitive case ended up causing more trouble than it avoided. And even as media have fragmented, the authorities behaved as if they were still in the days when the public's only sources of information were three broadcasters and a dozen newspapers.

The extremism Sprint appears to regret the passing of that era. The Sprint says extremism should include "spreading misinformation and conspiracy theories that undermine democracy." Recommendation 14 says the Government should "consider whether it is necessary to review the utility of the section 175 information crisis response power" of the Online Safety Act – presumably to toughen it. This section of the Act gives ministers the power to direct the media regulator, Ofcom, to harden its approach at times of threat to public safety or national security.

### **Freedom of speech**

The Sprint speaks of the "need to balance tackling harm with protecting freedom of speech" but does not always land on the right side of this line. Recommendation 15 says ministers should consider whether to introduce a new criminal offence of making "harmful communications," for instance on social media. As it says, such an offence was originally included in the Online Safety Bill (now Act) under the previous Government but was "removed as some stakeholders and parliamentarians were concerned about the impact on freedom of speech, and the potential to criminalise speech on the basis that it caused someone offence. The proposal was for a new offence based on likely psychological harm."

Recommendation 18 is to "reverse the previous government's code of practice" which aimed to limit the recording of "non-crime hate incidents" (NCHIs) against individuals. The 2024 Labour manifesto said it would "reverse the Conservatives' decision to downgrade the monitoring of antisemitic and Islamophobic hate." The Sprint says: "In advice sent to the Home Secretary, it was confirmed that this related to the NCHI code of practice and [the reversal] would encompass all five protected characteristics" (that is, all five characteristics protected by hate crime laws: not just anti-Muslim or anti-Semitic hate but all religious hatred along with hate based on race, disability, sexual orientation or gender reassignment.)

NCHIs are intensely controversial, criticised as a waste of police time, an avenue for malicious complaints and chilling to free speech, and featuring in the recent row about officers visiting a newspaper columnist, Allison Pearson, over a supposedly hateful tweet. An NCHI can be recorded by police against any individual on the basis of a single complaint. About 13,000 were recorded last year.<sup>23</sup> It does not involve any sanction and is not a criminal record but may show up on an enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check, potentially affecting employment prospects. NCHIs have been recorded against children after playground disputes and journalists who have used "outdated language."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-36558386>

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.thetimes.com/uk/crime/article/nine-year-old-among-thousands-investigated-for-hate-incidents-3czwz8zsl>

<sup>24</sup> *ibid*

The code of practice which the Sprint proposes to reverse was introduced after the Appeal Court ruled that subjecting a man to a police visit and NCHI after he posted gender-critical tweets breached his right to freedom of expression. The court ruled that additional safeguards were needed so that “the incursion into freedom of expression is no more than is strictly necessary.”<sup>25</sup> The code of practice says that an NCHI should only be recorded against a person if it is deemed proportionate and necessary to do so in order to mitigate a real risk of significant harm, or a real risk that a future criminal offence may be committed.

It requires police to utilise judgement and common sense and to satisfy themselves that the conduct complained of was motivated by intentional hostility to a person with a protected characteristic. It also says the accused should be told of the NCHI and given the opportunity to contest it, though this is still not an absolute right and some are not told.<sup>26</sup> After the Pearson row, in November 2024, Keir Starmer’s spokesman said the Home Office would further review guidance to protect “the fundamental right to free speech”<sup>27</sup> but the recommendation to reverse the code of practice, if enacted, is not consistent with that promise.

In the section on the extreme right wing, the Sprint enters difficult waters in declaring that “claims of ‘two-tier policing,’ where two groups are allegedly treated differently after similar behaviour” are an example of a “right-wing extremist narrative” which is “leaking into mainstream debates.” This is highly contentious – indeed claims of differential or two-tier policing have long been part of our politics.<sup>28</sup> The grooming gang scandal, recently returned to prominence, is an undeniable and officially acknowledged example of two-tier policing: the police would have acted differently had the perpetrators been white or the victims middle-class. More recently, claims of two-tier policing flowed from the political and journalistic mainstream as soon as the Metropolitan Police began taking controversial decisions at protests following 7/10.

Once accepted within Government, how will the suggestion that ‘two-tier policing’ is a “right-wing extremist narrative” be weaponised at the local and national level by civil servants, senior police and counter extremism practitioners? There is an obvious risk here of tarring significant swathes of the public as Far Right. A similar danger may exist through the Sprint categorising the Far Right as “hijacking extant local grievances about perceived inequalities around access to resources (eg benefits, migrant ‘hotels,’ etc.)” Debates over perceived inequalities in the provision of resources are, again, a staple of political discourse. Nor is it clear why the word hotels is in inverted commas – the latest figures state that as of September more than 35,000 migrants were indeed being accommodated in hotels.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Miller-v-College-of-Policing-judgment-201221.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/non-crime-hate-incidents-code-of-practice/non-crime-hate-incidents-code-of-practice-on-the-recording-and-retention-of-personal-data-accessible#necessary-considerations--proportionality-common-sense-approach-and-least-intrusive-method>

<sup>27</sup> <https://www.thetimes.com/article/b7b5898d-ea05-4b03-853a-56f18578dda7>

<sup>28</sup> From the left, Kenan Malik has outlined several such examples <https://www.pressreader.com/australia/the-guardian-australia/20241028/282303915626489>

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/32007279/migrants-living-in-hotels-cost-surge/>

## Part Two: Analysing the Documents in Detail

Viewed in the round, the Sprint is a curate's egg, good in parts. One positive development, for instance, is the creation of a ministerial board to take key decisions on matters related to extremism. The absence of the Minister for Border Security and Asylum from the proposed list of members is concerning, but the Sprint does, as we describe below, recommend more action in the area of immigration.

### Understanding Extremism?

The longest of the documents seen by Policy Exchange is entitled "Counter-Extremism Sprint: Understand", which was jointly authored by the Home Office Prevent section, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), and Homeland Security Analysis and Insight (HSAI). There is minimal information in the public domain about the latter two bodies and in this respect, the documents offer a fascinating glimpse into a world about which little is known. (Indeed, much of what goes on in the sphere of counter-extremism is opaque – deliberately and necessarily so.)

As noted earlier, "Understand" lists nine types of extremism in the following order – Islamist, extreme right wing, extreme misogyny, pro-Khalistan extremism, Hindu nationalist extremism, environmental extremism, Left wing, anarchist and single-issue extremism (LASI), violence fascination and conspiracy theories.<sup>30</sup>

On the subject of Islamism, the authors do recognise core challenges – for example that Islamist extremists rarely push openly for violence but can reinforce some of the framing of Salafi-Jihadis. The importance of grievance, blasphemy and international factors are mentioned. This is crucial, as underlined by the ongoing fallout from the 7/10 attacks and the renewed conflict between Hamas and Israel. Indeed, there is at least a case for saying the most recent international crises in the Middle East is likely to have a far greater impact in this country than did 9/11; this is what senior security officials believe.

The text recognises that Islamist extremism, by denying free religious expression and equal treatment under the law, is "in opposition to HMG's fundamental values." This is to be welcomed. It would be reassuring to hear such words more often from Ministers. Less reassuringly, given this is a document for internal consumption, no groups are mentioned by name on this page. While the threat of legal action from Islamist groups and activists is ever present, as an institution the Government needs to have clarity – at least with itself -- about who it sees as a problem. Consistent failure on this front will lead critics to take the view that the Government seeks to address the 'what' in terms of the problems it faces, but does it understand the 'who'?

While Britain's Islamist scene seems to expand in both size and confidence each year, the Far Right is smaller but also nasty – being responsible for around a quarter of the UK's terror plots.<sup>31</sup> "Understand" correctly observes that the Far Right identifies 'out' groups which it seeks to vilify – indeed this has been observable recently in some of the language towards

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<sup>30</sup> The text is unnumbered, but taking the pages in the order they come, these pages run from 14-22.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/director-general-ken-mccallum-gives-latest-threat-update>

Kemi Badenoch since her election as Conservative Party leader. Note for example references on social media to Badenoch as ‘Olukemi’ in order to stress her Nigerian heritage as much as possible. This replicates the way, a generation earlier, British National Party (BNP) figures such as John Tyndall referred to Conservative politician Michael Howard as Michael Hecht.

The sections on Islamist and Far Right extremism are followed by a page devoted to extreme misogyny,<sup>32</sup> much of which details the harms flowing from the “manosphere”, men’s rights activists, pick up artists and Incels (the involuntary celibate). Doubtless there is much here one would want to oppose. But is the focus here proportionate and reasonable? It is less than a year since the Commission for Countering Extremism (CCE) conducted the largest piece of research thus far into Incels.<sup>33</sup> This found that the Incel ‘threat’ while at times unpleasant, was more a case for mental health support than counter terror intervention. As the CCE exists to give impartial advice to the Government, and its Commissioner is an appointee of the Home Office, it is notable the Home Office appear to have ignored its own advisors.

Beyond this, it is striking – given the recent political furore around the issue – that the discussion of “extreme misogyny” has almost nothing to say about ‘grooming gangs’. It would be hard to think of a more obvious set of harms arising from what in other contexts the Sprint would term “extremist” views about young girls. Yet on this subject, the text is mostly silent. The main reference is a statement that “right wing extremists frequently exploit cases of alleged group-based sexual abuse to promote anti-Muslim sentiment as well as anti-government and anti-‘political correctness’ narratives.” This framing is telling: not an issue of misogyny in its own right, but as an “alleged” problem “exploit[ed]” by the Far Right.

Later, under the list of harms which result from extremism, we are informed child sexual exploitation and abuse as a result of extremist beliefs is perpetrated by Satanist groups such as the Order of 9 Angles, 764 and Com Network.<sup>34</sup> There have been convictions, under terrorism legislation and for other offences, of young men associated with these groups – more most follow.<sup>35</sup> However, given the accusations of racial abuse towards some of the white victims of grooming,<sup>36</sup> is the Government confident Rochdale, Rotherham, Telford and other towns should go unmentioned here? The numbers involved in that type of grooming, indeed the numbers already convicted, far exceed those involved in the groups listed above. Again, therefore, one might question whether precious resources are being deployed in the right place?

In discussing environmental extremism, and what is termed LASI (Left wing, Anarchism and Single Issue) extremism, the Sprint admits that there has only been one environmental

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<sup>32</sup> Counter-Extremism Sprint: Understand, p. 16

<sup>33</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/Government/publications/predicting-harm-among-incels-involuntary-celibates/34d77c27-31e4-421c-bd0b-afa000268297>

<sup>34</sup> Counter-Extremism Sprint: Understand, p. 10

<sup>35</sup> See for example <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c9w5rkzxl4o> and <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ceke1e1177xo>

<sup>36</sup> Maggie Oliver, *Survivors: Fighting for Justice*, London: John Blake, 2019, p. 216-217

terrorism case in recent years.<sup>37</sup> However, threats certainly exist – Palestine Action’s campaign against British manufacturing companies with a connection to Israel could have disastrous effects on industry if companies start to leave the UK due to intimidation. It is arguable, though, that a better response to these phenomena, as evidenced by the case of Just Stop Oil, is to commit the resources necessary to uphold existing laws.

Pages 17-18 of “Understand” are devoted to two types of extremism which have their origins in the Indian subcontinent – what is described as Pro-Khalistan Extremism and Hindu Nationalist Extremism. With regards to the former, the report offers the caveat that support for a Sikh state of Khalistan is not necessarily extremist; the problem is when this outlook leads to the advocacy of violence in support of that cause. That is a logical position for the UK Government to take. However much more controversial will be the assessment of a “growing portfolio of actors of concern” within the Khalistan movement; and reference to activism which contributes to “the demonisation of Muslim communities, in particular in relation to child sexual exploitation allegations” and what are seen as conspiracy theories alleging collusion between the British and Indian Governments. The report does however recognise concerns exist about the Indian Government’s overseas role, including accusations of Indian involvement in deadly violence against Sikhs in Canada and the United States.<sup>38</sup>

Hindu Nationalist Extremism (also referred to as Hindutva, which roughly translates as ‘Hinduness’) was not mentioned in the 2023 Independent Review of Prevent – something that with hindsight can be seen as a mistake. Given the violence which occurred in Leicester in September 2022 between Hindus and Muslims, the Government is correct to place Hindu Nationalist Extremism under the spotlight – not least as knowledge of it is generally low. Equally notable here is the declaration that in Leicester “key voices within both Muslim and Hindu communities also played a significant role in opportunistically exploiting tensions and inciting hate among the local communities.”

After this review of the different forms extremism can take, the “Understand” document examines international approaches to this subject – and considers whether other countries might be doing things better than the UK. The Home Office is to be applauded for asking itself that question, and some work has clearly begun in looking at best (and presumably) worst practice in other western nations.

Policy Exchange has long noted the rigour with which Denmark not only keeps out overseas extremists but does so with clarity – even providing an English language webpage on the religious speakers banned from Danish territory.<sup>39</sup> It is therefore encouraging to read that “The Nordic countries have conducted significant work to tackle overseas extremists and

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<sup>37</sup> The example given is that of Nikolaos Karvounakis in Scotland <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-edinburgh-east-fife-60059070>

<sup>38</sup> <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-against-indian-Government-employee-connection-foiled>

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.nyidanmark.dk/en-GB/Words-and-concepts/US/Religious-workers/Religious-preachers-with-entry-ban/?anchor=7C5D2D143D284E4EB2829BA5F0F04837&callbackItem=C0848E0180C34017BFB14DC9BC116572&callbackAnchor=608DF21DB20C40B68646A6B6804E595D7C5D2D143D284E4EB2829BA5F0F04837>

may provide a useful opportunity for engagement on HMG visa watchlisting work.” There is also praise for the Dutch National Extremism Strategy 2024-9, apparently rooted in a commitment to protect the democratic rule of law against extremist influences. By contrast, there is an evident lack of enthusiasm for the approach taken in France and the United States respectively, both of which are seen as operating policies that are too narrow and too inclined to view extremism through a purely national security lens.

In its conclusions, “Understand” envisages a three-pronged approach, grounded in: targeted/punitive measures; building resilience; and learning from partners. The suggested targeting of online platforms suggests future debates around free speech will be robust, and that the rows over the influence of Elon Musk and X are unlikely to have peaked.

As ‘Understand’ comes to a close it is clear the authors envisage a series of future research projects lasting, presumably, several years. A focus on ‘knowledge gaps’ records that there is a limited contemporary understanding of extremism, limited understanding of the relationship between extremism and harm and, perhaps surprisingly given the desire to do more about online extremism, that “the role that the internet plays in spreading and exacerbating extremist ideology is poorly understood.”

Although “Understand” does not say so, this need for further information goes some way to making the case for the continued existence of the Commission for Countering Extremism, under Robin Simcox. Given much academic output in the fields of terrorism and counter-extremism is of limited value to practitioners and tends to focus on deconstructing Prevent and the alleged ‘securitisation’ of minority communities, the case for a body producing research and advice from outside Government and largely outside academia, is strong.

### **Proposals for action**

On the basis (presumably) of the analysis contained within the “Understand” document, the CE Sprint Capping Paper proposes that the Government undertake five shifts in its counter extremism approach with a view to:

- Strengthening a punitive approach;
- Increasing the focus on prevention;
- Taking a behaviour based and ideologically agnostic approach;
- Adopting an enhanced online approach; and
- Achieving effective cross-government delivery.

A full list of the 38 recommendations can be found at Appendix 1. These are divided into three tiers, each of which is defined by the level of resource required and likely timeframe for implementation. As per the Sprint “Capping” document”:

- Tier One (recommendations 1-28) are said to be deliverable with no extra funding, but will require some resource;
- Tier Two (recommendations 29-32) are said to require a small commitment of extra funding from within existing budgets;
- Tier Three (recommendations 33-38) will require c.£180m and would be implemented from 2026-27.

Taken collectively, the recommendations – like the analysis upon which they are based -- are something of a mixed bag. The Sprint states that a full counter-extremism strategy will be published this year. Nevertheless, there are important departures for policy. The first set of proposals (#1-9) lay out a new structure and focus for countering extremism. Recommendation 1 thus states “Responsibility for Counter-Extremism moves to the Home Office” (under the Conservatives it had largely sat at the Department for Levelling Up Housing and Communities, DLUHC). Counter-extremism will be now delivered by a standalone counter-extremism team within the Home Office’s Prevent Directorate, which is to be renamed the Prevent and Counter-Extremism Directorate. As recommendation 6 acknowledges, counter extremism work will still require close cooperation with MHCLG (the department formerly known as DLUHC). And herein one can see the potential for continued confusion.

The documents make clear that the effort to tackle hate crime will be a key lens through which extremism is approached. Yet as the CE Summary Paper explains (in discussion of Recommendation 7), responsibility for racial and religious hate crime strategy remains under MHCLG. This seems to fit awkwardly within a new dispensation in which the Home Office takes greater control of counter extremism work.

Elsewhere, though not formally listed under the recommendations of the Capping Report, a key part of this new structure will be a Counter Extremism Ministerial Board (see the separate paper ‘Terms of Reference’). This Board is to be chaired by the Security Minister, who will be supported by the Director of Prevent and Counter-Extremism. It is the body tasked with “the agreement and implementation of the CE Sprint’s recommendations” as well as with the general “oversight and development of HMG’s CE Strategy”.

For those who wish to see elected politicians take both decisions and responsibility, the creation of a Counter Extremism Ministerial Board, with representatives from across Government, devolved administrations, Counter Terrorism Policing and the Security Service, marks a welcome suggestion. The members are named as follows:

1. Dan Jarvis MBE MP – Minister for Security at the Home Office
2. Rt Hon Diana Johnson MP – Minister for Policing, Crime and Fire Prevention

3. Jess Phillips MP – Minister for Safeguarding and Violence Against Women and Girls at the Home Office
4. Lord Timpson – Minister of State for Prisons at the Ministry of Justice
5. Stephen Morgan MP – Minister for Early Education at the Department for Education
6. Lord Khan of Burnley – Lords Minister for Faith, Communities and Resettlement at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government
7. Baroness Jones of Whitchurch – Minister for the Future Digital Economy and Online Safety at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
8. Stephanie Peacock MP – Minister for Sport, Media, Civil Society and Youth at the Department for Science Innovation and Technology
9. Chloe Squires – Director General, Homeland Security Group, Home Office
10. Michael Stewart – Director, Prevent and Counter-Extremism, Home Office
11. Scott Storrie – Deputy Director, Counter Radicalisation and Enablers Unit, Home Office
12. DAC Victoria Evans – Senior National Coordinator, Counter Terrorism Policing
13. Paul Gianassi OBE – Hate Crime Advisor, National Police Chiefs Council
14. A Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre representative
15. A Security Service (MI5) representative
16. A GCHQ representative
17. Angela Constance MSP – the Scottish Government, Cabinet Secretary for Justice and Home Affairs
18. Jane Hutt – the Welsh Government, Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice, Trefnydd and Chief Whip
19. Gordon Lyons – the Northern Ireland Executive, Communities Minister

Independent and ad hoc members



1. Robin Simcox – Commissioner, Commission for Countering Extremism
2. Helen Earner – Charity Commission

This structure potentially reduces any gaps that existed between work on counter-terrorism, counter-extremism and social cohesion. It ties departments into decisions and allows for a forum where progress on initiatives can be discussed. One omission appears to be input from the Minister of State for Border Security and Asylum, at a time when we need to narrow the space between those working on domestic and border security. One of the best ways of dealing with extremists is still to stop them coming here in the first place.

However, on this front, there are some grounds for encouragement. Yvette Cooper has maintained enhanced border checks for preachers coming into the UK and the Sprint further envisages a ‘visa watching pilot’ (Recommendation 26). More specifically though, the Government might focus its efforts on ensuring that visas are no longer issued to clerics from the Islamic Republic of Iran to minister in this country – as recently proposed by Policy Exchange.<sup>40</sup> Iran is a hostile state, which seeks to replicate its own politico-religious infrastructure here. There is no reason why we should allow them to do so, especially when Iran seeks to conduct terrorist attacks in this country and mistreats British-Iranians in its custody<sup>41</sup>.

Beyond structures, as already indicated, the work undertaken by the previous Government to define extremism and potentially place specific extremist groups outside of the Government’s embrace is abandoned. Recommendation 3 of the Sprint states “The scope of HMG’s CE function should be clearly set out, and should take an approach based on behaviours that cause harm rather than one based on a definition.”

Recommendations 10-17 are focused on questions of legislation. They make clear (#10) that there is to be no new “standalone” CE legislation. But they do envisage changes to law that will reflect certain key impulses: the desire to extend the aggravating offences for hate crime to include sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity; the tendency to see the question of extremism through the lens of public order (#13 and #17); and the attention to online safety (#14 and #15).

Recommendation 12 calls on the Government to “ensure the Charity Commission (CC) has the powers necessary to target extremist abuse of the charity sector.” A consultation on amendments to the Charities Act 2011 is proposed. These would centre on adding certain offences such as hate crimes to the grounds for automatic disqualification, and disqualification re immigration offences or the promotion of violence. This is fine in principle, but how will this change the sedate pace at which the CC so often conducts its inquiries? One-two years is the norm. A statutory inquiry into the Iranian-linked Islamic Centre of England has now been running since November 2022.<sup>42</sup> Should the CC continue to

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<sup>40</sup> <https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/tehran-calling/>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/03/25/public-deserves-know-why-britain-giving-visas-iranian-clerics/?msocid=1d3482b318ac6d0e0804922b19cf6c19>

<sup>42</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/regulator-launches-inquiry-into-islamic-centre-of-england>

be expected to combine work advising high street charities, with matters that potentially involve hostile states and which could conceivably impact national security? The balance here looks out of kilter.

Recommendation 20, meanwhile, calls for increased disruption of individuals, organisations and spaces that have a radicalising impact in communities. In some ways this provides gloss to the earlier recommendation (#9) that disruption be extended to 'extreme misogyny' and 'dis/misinformation'. But what does all of this mean in practice? Recommendation 20 speaks of using "police led partnerships". But who would these be with? What would they entail? Operation LEGRO (discussed under Recommendation 24) is the name of an intervention by counter-extremism authorities and police that has apparently been running against Hamas and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, although any successes are unrecorded.

Recommendations 23-28 are concerned with 'outputs and delivery' within the ambit of Tier One. Notable proposals here include those for: a new CE strategy in 2025 (#23); and the apparent rebadging of the "Prevent Disruptions workstream" as "CE disruptions" (#24).

Recommendations 29-31 are those classified as 'Tier Two' and concerned primarily with improved training, education and the building of "resilience".

Recommendations 32-38, finally, are those 'Tier Three' proposals which are judged to require more funding and a longer timeline for deliver. Again, there are some striking developments here.

Recommendation 34, for instance, suggests that the remit for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to work on extremism be extended, both in the community and in schools, and that full-time Chaplaincy Intervention Providers be taken on for de-radicalisation duties (Recommendation 37). Again, one might ask: what will this mean in practice? Which organisations and providers do the authors have in mind here? Could this mean that, as in the past, organisations with records of extremism were used to do anti-extremism work?

The methodology section for the above-cited "Counter Extremism Sprint: Understand" document states that the authors have spoken to some "civil society organisations, and frontline practitioners in both priority and non-priority Prevent areas, as well as the Local Government Authority." To properly understand how the Sprint has reached the conclusions it has, it would be useful to know which groups and individuals were involved and to what end.

## Conclusion

Overall, the leaked documents are a hodgepodge, with some grounds for encouragement, such as a counter-extremism ministerial board --- but also significant cause for concern. In particular, in trying to right social wrongs through counter-extremism, the Government risks spreading its efforts too thin, and ending up with a programme that is less than the sum of its parts – and insufficiently focused on the areas that matter most.

The very title of the Sprint suggested a focused, dynamic review that would produce a coherent, comprehensible and effective new basis for policy. Unfortunately, the documents seen by Policy Exchange suggest that the Government has not achieved such an outcome.

The Sprint papers are not the final word. Policy will be made not by them but by ministers and senior practitioners. Last month, the Home Secretary made a statement about Prevent which may suggest that she does not fully subscribe to the policy proposed in the Sprint.

As she put it: “Islamist terrorism remains the primary threat... Concerns over low numbers of referrals [to Prevent] for Islamist extremism have still not been addressed, and at the same time a lack of clarity remains over whether Prevent should be confined to cases of clear ideology or should also be picking up cases where the ideology is less clear, or where there is a fixation with violence.”<sup>43</sup>

Against that, the Prime Minister’s response this month to the Southport convictions risked sending policy back the wrong way again. It was notable, however, that the response to his remarks from senior figures such as Neil Basu, the former police counter-terrorism commander, and Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, was deeply sceptical.<sup>44</sup>

They are right. This Sprint runs in the wrong direction. Like the previous reviewer of Prevent, William Shawcross, Policy Exchange believes counter-extremism and counter-terrorism policy should be more focused on ideology - not, as the Sprint says, less. It should focus on causes – as well as on symptoms.

As this paper has stated, the purpose of counter-extremism and counter-terrorism is to defend the security of the country, its democratic system, its values and its institutions against those whose beliefs and acts intentionally threaten them – in the jargon, systemic threats.

Such threats come overwhelmingly from those with an ideological or political motive, principally Islamism but also Far-Right and other forms of extremism. The Sprint’s deprioritisation of Islamism risks handing a massive victory to the bad actors who have sought to delegitimise the state’s fight against this dangerous ideology through concerted campaigns of half-truths and lies.

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<sup>43</sup> <https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2024-12-17/hcws327>

<sup>44</sup> <https://news.sky.com/video/independent-reviewer-sceptical-on-changing-terrorism-definition-13294123>

Prevent, in particular, as both Shawcross and the facts say, is already too often being asked to deal with people, behaviours and problems well outside the national security remit; and to cover for failings in other services, such as youth mental health. Partly as a result, it has missed or not dealt effectively with several people who presented a more systemic threat - including the Islamist terrorist who murdered an MP, Sir David Amess, because of his vote for airstrikes on Syria, and investigated murdering many others.

If MPs know that voting a particular way in Parliament exposes them to the threat of assassination, and are not confident that the counter-extremism system can protect them from that threat, that is clearly an interference with the entire democratic process, and thus a problem for every citizen of the country. That is why Amess's killing was more than a simple murder.

Counter-extremism policy, and Prevent in particular, is already intensely controversial, regularly if often unfairly accused of interfering with people's democratic rights or creating target communities. Defining as extremist a massively expanded range of activity and behaviours, including criticism of two-tier policing, risks dramatically inflating that problem. It risks genuine harm to democratic debate, damaging what it seeks to protect. It risks politicising obvious and non-partisan wrongs such as violence against women, making them harder to address.

This is not to say that social ills should not be tackled, or terrible crimes such as Southport should not be better prevented - merely that those things should not be done through the counter-extremism or counter-terrorism lens. So Policy Exchange agrees with Hall and Basu, too, about the need for a "non-extremist" version of Prevent which could deal with the failings seen in the authorities' interactions with the likes of the Southport killer, Axel Rudakubana.

Even more after the national trauma of Southport, the danger is that in its rush to be seen to be doing something, the Government will make bad policy.

## Appendix 1

### Terror attacks causing death or injury in Great Britain since 1999

We chose 1999 as the starting point because it marked the first serious far-right terror attack of the modern era. Only attacks causing death or injury are included. Attacks where the death or injury were not tried as terrorism, or officially identified as terrorism in the absence of a trial, are not included. Death and injury figures do not include perpetrators. Perpetrator figures include those who died carrying out the attack or were subsequently convicted for their role in it. List as of December 2024.

#### *Far-right terror attacks*

<b>Incident</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Dead</b>	<b>Inj</b>	<b>Perps</b>
London nail bombings (x3)	17-30.4.99	3	140	1
Mohammed Saleem	29.4.13	1	0	1
Jo Cox	16.6.16	1	0	1
Finsbury Park	19.6.17	1	10	1
Vincent Fuller	16.3.19	0	1	1
Dover migrant centre	30.10.22	0	2	1
Callum Parslow	2.4.24	0	1	1
<b>Total (7 incidents, 9 attacks)</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>7</b>

#### *Islamist terror attacks*

<b>Incident</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Dead</b>	<b>Inj</b>	<b>Perps</b>
DC Stephen Oake	14.1.03	1	0	1
7 July 2005 attacks (x4)	7.7.05	52	784	4
Glasgow Airport	30.6.07	0	5	2
Stephen Timms	14.5.10	0	1	1
Lee Rigby	22.5.13	1	0	2
Westminster Bridge/ HoP	22.3.17	5	48	1
Manchester Arena	22.5.17	22	239	2
London Bridge	3.6.17	8	48	3
Parsons Green	15.9.17	0	30	1
Westminster car	14.8.18	0	3	1
Manchester Victoria	31.12.18	0	3	1
Fishmongers' Hall	29.11.19	2	3	1
Whitemoor prison	9.1.20	0	3	2
Streatham stabbings	2.2.20	0	3	1
Reading	20.6.20	3	3	1
Munawar Hussain	2.12.20	0	2	1
David Amess	15.10.21	1	0	1
Liverpool Women's Hospital	14.11.21	0	1	1

Terence Carney, Hartlepool	15.10.23	1	1	1
<b>Total (19 incidents, 22 attacks)</b>		<b>96</b>	<b>1177</b>	<b>28</b>